soldiers and spies Warfare
is a major human activity.
Matters military: The military matters.
You are visiting the website of a Slovene author who
publishes articles and books on warfare and warcraft.
Marijan F. Kranjc worked a number of years for the Security
Service of the Yugoslav People's Army, making him an
excellent witness to the post-war history of the Yugoslav,
i.e. South-Slavonic nations. His works include some hushed-up
military and security-intelligence service secrets.
In addition to a typological analysis, which
is the central focus of the article, the author briefly considers some
significant doctrinal features of low-intensity conflict (LIC). Taking
some illustrative examples of conflict in the contemporary world, he
analyses the latest doctrinal trends in the USA, the USSR, and some
other countries, anticipating this to be the likely warfare of the
future. The author maintains that it is the acquaintance with all
doctrinal trends in LIC that, firstly, supports the consideration of the
necessity of building up and perfecting the Socialist Federative
Republic of Yugoslavia's (SFRY) total national defense and the concept
of social self-protection, and, secondly, enables anticipation of a
potential aggressor's warfare to be expected in a LIC situation launched
against the SFRY, thus optimizing the search for an adequate model of
the SFRY's armed forces that would be capable of deterring the aggressor.
(After original abstract by V. K., editor of Vojno delo, 1990.)
2007, Spopad nizke intenzivnosti.
s.p.,: Maribor. top of
Skimming through the website of the Ministry
of Defense of the Republic of Slovenia in late 2006, I noticed that
authors of Slovene military doctrine had entered the concept of low-intensity
conflict (LIC). Since I was unable to find any definition as to the
meaning of the concept, I decided to inform the public and publish my
own Major-General Degree paper on the warfare of LIC.
The US Department of the Army defines LIC as:
... a political-military confrontation between contending states or
groups below conventional war and above the routine, peaceful
competition among states. It frequently involves protracted struggles of
competing principles and ideologies. Low-intensity conflict ranges from
subversion to the use of the armed forces. It is waged by a combination
of means, employing political, economic, informational, and military
instruments. Low-intensity conflicts are often localized, generally in
the Third World, but contain regional and global security implications.
United States Department of the Army (5 December 1990), Field Manual
100-20: Military Operations in Low Intensity Conflict) àhttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Low_intensity_conflict
(Accessed 18 August 2009.)
In my book, I first refer to LIC in the broader sense, defining it as "a political-military confrontation (conflict), in which all available
forces and means are combined and employed". In the narrower sense, LIC
is "a limited or controlled (directed), most frequently protracted
political-military engagement, predominantly characterized by non-combat
activities, primarily various types of support, protection, defense,
active prevention, pressure and demonstration of force and power. In
other words, it involves initiation and management of crisis situations,
as well as intensive and short-term combat (interventions) on land, at
sea and in the aerospace, directly (contact operation) and indirectly (non-contact
operation or distance operation)" (Kranjc, 2007: 76).
In 1989 I defended my Major-General Degree paper dealing with the
influence of the doctrine of LIC on the combat construction of the
Yugoslav People's Army (YPA). I was the second YPA general to pass the
final examination on this topic, so I, naturally, considered myself as a
first-class expert in this new military doctrine. Another reason for
publishing my degree was the fact that before 1991 only generals and
admirals had not been able to publish their examination projects, while
M.A. and Ph.D. theses had been freely published.
The visitors to my website now have an exceptional opportunity of
learning what a YPA General examination degree was like. The General
rank examination was composed of two parts: the practical and the
theoretical examination. My practical examination consisted of a
commanding trip through the region of Lika, from Gospić to Kočevje. I
received a positive mark and after that I delved into the theoretical
Unfortunately, some problems awaited me, since my first degree
supervisor died! My new supervisor, a very good military specialist,
however, was not satisfied with my views, making me rewrite some of my
conclusions, as these were not in accordance with the YPA General Staff's future departures from Tito's doctrine of total national resistance (the
departures of which I was sadly unaware at the time and did not approve
of later on either.) In the end I received a Very Good mark. After three
months I was promoted to the rank of Major-General.
When in September 1990 I heard that an attack against Slovenia was being
prepared, I requested to be retired. My published General Degree paper
is a comprehensive presentation of the new doctrine of LIC, with my
original conclusions how to fight it.
It is noteworthy that the YPA top officials were alarmed by my degree
paper and my 1990 article, while a former CIA agent informed me that CIA
and DIA were interested in both my article and the 2007 book publication.
INTELLIGENCE-SECURITY PROTECTION OF THE MARCH OF THE
NATIONAL LIBERATION ARMY's 14th
DIVISION AND SLOVENE PARTISAN UNITS TO ŠTAJERSKA
"OBVEŠČEVALNO-VARNOSTNA ZAŠČITA POHODA 14. DIVIZIJE NOV IN PO SLOVENIJE
(Skica za varnostno študijo)." Borec. No. 561–563/1998,
Ljubljana top of
In a draft for a security study, the
author condenses scattered fragments on intelligence and security
preparations for the march of the National Liberation Army's 14th Division and Slovene Partisan units to Štajersko (Slovene Styria) and on
protection measures during the march. This is the first attempt at an
overall treatment of the subject, which the author describes as a
The author, an expert on security issues, has systematically examined
and presented accessible sources and memoirs, done a questionnaire among
the intelligence personnel and participants in the march, and talked
with some of them at length. In doing so, he was following his thesis
that the march claimed a great many casualties (more than 50 per cent)
not so much because of the tactical and operational errors and the
appalling winter conditions, but rather because of poor intelligence-security
preparations and protection, an almost total lack of coordination with
intelligence and security bodies in the field, and negligence with
regard to counter-intelligence protection in the units.
Details published in memoirs lead the author to tentative conclusions,
presented in special supplements, that there was a carefully placed
German (Gestapo) agent in each of the three brigades, and that the
Germans set up a special police and counter-intelligence system in
Štajersko. For this reason the author doubts that the demonstrative
march across Croatia (with ten skirmishes and a mass of rallies!) was
not a surprise to the Germans.
The author rightly claims that the counter-intelligence mistakes cannot
be remedied by the heroism of the fighters and their commanders.
Obviously, only when German archives (those of the Gestapo, Abwehr and
Sicherheitsdienst) are made accessible to the public, will it be
possible to establish with due certainty all the dimensions of the
intelligence penetration of the 14th Division and Partisan units, which
is also the reason why this work can only be a draft for a study. The
author, interestingly, does not give too much credence to the statements
of the exposed and executed agents: the later reconstructions
unequivocally showed that some statements were obtained by force and
that many liquidated "infiltrators and Gestapo men" were indeed innocent,
for instance the ones in the Bračič Brigade, which was later admitted by
the 14th Division Commander.
(Revised English summary published in Borec.)
BALKAN MILITARY RANGE (Military-security records)
"BALKANSKI VOJAŠKI POLIGON (Vojaško-varnostni
zapisi.)" Borec. No.
Ljubljana, 328 pp.
BALKANSKI VOJAŠKI POLIGON (2nd Revised Edition on CD-ROM in
.LIT and .PDF).
PRO-ANDY, s.p.,: Maribor, 2008 top of
The author tackles a topical subject from
post-war history, which may be expected to meet with different responses.
In three integral chapters, carefully supplemented and interlaced with
short biographical pieces, he presents the causes for and the chronology
of major events in the period between 1945 and 1995 in the Balkans and
He introduces three destabilization processes affecting the Socialist
Federative Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY), namely: the first or the
Western destabilization attempt, coded Express, between 1945 and 1947 (unsuccessful),
the second or the Eastern destabilization attempt during the Informbiro
period between 1948 and 1952 (unsuccessful), and notably the third or
the Western destabilization D- day plan, spanning the from 1980 to 1995,
which ended in a bitter war and the disintegration of the SFRY. The
author gives proof of a daring thesis that in a directed and guided
destabilization process implemented through the warfare of the current
military doctrine of low-intensity conflict (LIC), the external factors
have invariably decisive predominance over the internal ones. Taking
illustrative examples from other parts of the world, the author provides
a clear presentation of how, following a prepared scenario and in
accordance with its doctrine, a certain superpower interfered in the
given situation and forced its will on the nationalistic brawlers in
"the Balkan tavern." He anticipates a similar course of events with
another crisis in the making, i.e. Kosovo.
For the first time in Slovene history, the Counter-Intelligence Service
(CIS) of the Yugoslav People's Army (YPA) is presented in a compact and
comprehensive form. The CIS successfully protected both the Yugoslav
Army and the state for fifty years, still the figures and security-political
evaluations found in classified documents cannot truly present all the
efforts put forth by the CIS to defend the SFRY. Notwithstanding, the
author tries to demystify the role and importance of the CIS and later
the Security Service of the YPA, in which he worked for almost thirty
years. The Security Service of the YPA met a sad fate for the same
reason as the YPA itself: the CIS made a wrong strategic, political and
security estimate that one may impose one's own political will on other
The second part gives an intriguing and detailed presentation of the
genesis of the attacks on the YPA spanning the years between 1942 and
1991. He presents the post-Tito period between1980 and 1990 and the main
elements of the D-day plan leading to the disintegration of the SFRY.
The author also discusses the notorious "Military Trial against the Four",
i.e. against three Slovene civilians and a Slovene Noncom of the YPA, in
which he played the role of a literally "burgled party." Using published
and unpublished records and publishing the first three classified YPA
documents, he manages to persuasively prove that the "Military Trial
against the Four" was neither a political matter nor set up by the YPA.
Apparently, it was a military trial imposed on the YPA within the
framework of an over-all scheme to compromise the CIS.
The third chapter focuses on a concise and well-documented presentation
of the theoretical basis of the low-intensity conflict doctrine, which
the author applies in order to offer theoretical proof of his thesis on
the prevalence of the external factors. In addition, he shows it is this
US warfare doctrine that includes elements that were tested out in the
Balkan military range: the break-up of a multi-national state, leading
to - without armed combat or a major number of victims, yet by
deployment of an array of non-combat means, primarily by NATO
peacekeeping forces (Unprofor, Ifor, Sfor) - an "occupation" of Bosnia
and Herzegovina, and the act of forcing on them (Dayton) peace.
Special attention should be dedicated to the chapters on the scenario of
the guided or directed destabilization process of the SFRY, as well as
the concise and documented presentation of the Yugoslav internal wars,
especially that in Slovenia.
The author Marijan F. Kranjc, Major-General and Chief-of-Staff of the
Bitola Army Corps, was the first Slovene general to leave the YPA in
October 1990, because he was painfully aware that one must not fight
against one's own nation!
SLOVENE MILITARY INTELLICTUALS: GENERALS AND ADMIRALS
(Draft of an anthropological study)
"SLOVENSKA VOJAŠKA INTELIGENCA: GENERALI IN ADMIRALI. (Skica za
Borec, No. 579–582/2000, Ljubljana
á top of
The author discusses an almost forgotten
and even ignored topic of Slovene military intellectuals. The first
three chapters present a number of general issues and lexicographic data
on the history of military intellectuals, military education and the
formation of the military science section, along with fascinating
information on military science as an interdisciplinary branch of
The author makes up his own "non-ideological and genetic" list of all
Slovene generals and admirals (255). Last but not least, he submits to
the Slovenian Academy of Sciences and Arts a proposal for a new class of
research: Section of Military Science.
In November 2007 the author published an updated list of Slovene
generals and admirals (298).
(Taken from the revised English summary published in Borec.)
SLOVENE MILITARY INTELLECTUAL
SLOVENSKA VOJAŠKA INTELIGENCA. Grafis Trade: Grosuplje top of
This is the first book about the Slovene
military intellectual elite. The foreword is written by Dr. Iztok
Podbregar, Lieutenant General, former Chief of the General Staff of the
Slovene Armed Forces.
The main part of the book focuses on the earliest Slovene military
intellectuals, who due to historical circumstances were placed in
foreign, or "joint" national armies, first in the Austro-Hungarian Army
and later in the two Yugoslav Armies – the Royal Army and the Yugoslav
People's Army. The author suggests the following four candidates to be
regarded as the first Slovene generals, serving at the Military Frontier
(Vojna Krajina): Jernej Basaj, b. 1720, in the Austro-Hungarian Army:
Pavel Seničar, b. 1760 and Josip Novak, b.1772, and an admiral in the
British Navy: John Jeffrey Rakovec, b.1770.
Furthermore he discusses two periods which laid the foundations for both
an independent Slovene state and a Slovene army. The first period
spanned the years 1918 and 1919, when the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and
Slovenes was founded and the struggles for Slovenia's Northern border
raged, in which General Rudolf Maister distinguished himself. During the
same period, Rear-Admiral Metod Koch was entrusted with the formation of
the first Yugoslav Navy.
The second period, between 1941 and 1945, is the time of the National
Liberation Movement and the Slovene Partisan Army. In May 1943, Franc
Rozman – (nom de guerre) Stane, Chief of the General Staff of the
Slovene Partisan Army was appointed as the first Partisan Major-General.
The author also mentions Slovene officers, non-commissioned officers,
soldiers and seamen. The author presents their list and a detailed list
of Slovene generals and admirals, folk heroes and many renowned warriors,
including national heroes, heading the list of the Slovene military
Owing to its genetic principle, the list is expected to receive some
criticisms. Scientifically correct, taking paternal and maternal genetic
material into equal consideration, it runs counter to the widespread and
somewhat chauvinist opinion that "nationally pure" Slovenes can only be
traced along the male line. Drawing from the latest genetic research
findings, the author rejects this opinion with considerable
justification. For instance, Wilhelm Tegetthoff, Vice Admiral of the
Austro-Hungarian Navy, has already been recognized as a Slovene on the
strength of his mother's origin, therefore there is no good reason why
the same principle should not apply to other similar cases.
The author's main message is that throughout history, the Slovenes have
proven themselves as a nation of rebels and courageous warriors, i.e.
seamen, excellent officers, decoration holders, national and folk heroes,
winners of national awards, inventors, doctors of military and defense
sciences, astronauts and some 250 generals and admirals. The work
provides a firm basis for a discussion of Slovene military intellectual
elite prior to the formation of the proper Slovene Armed Forces.
(Taken from the revised English summary published in Borec.)
PLOTS AND ATTEMPTS
- in a new
book for Croatia in 2011 top of
Having worked for almost
30 years for the Security Service of the Yugoslav People's
Army (YPA), I felt qualified enough to tackle the sensitive
topic of political plots and assassination attempts at on
Josip Broz Tito.
From 1945 onwards, both the Western superpowers and the
former USSR attempted to assassinate Marshal Tito and, in so
doing, "behead" the Socialist Federative Republic of
Yugoslavia (SFRY). This seems to support my thesis that the
SFRY was not disintegrated on its own, but was, in their
pursuit of geopolitical and strategic interests, first
distributed among the superpowers (Teheran, Potsdam,
Casablanca), to be eventually shattered to pieces in a
bitter and sanguinary war (1991–1995).
In my book The Balkan Military Range (1998), I prove the
daring thesis that in a directed and guided destabilization
process implemented through the contemporary warfare of low-intensity
conflict, the external factors have invariably decisive
predominance over the internal ones. The "Day X" or the
final phase of this plan could happen only after Tito's
death, be it natural or violent. With so many plotted and
attempted assassinations, there is no doubt that the
Security Service of the YPA, of which I was a member, may
take credit for the fact that Tito died in bed of natural
My new book for Croatia also presents a
systematic treatment of all known Tito political plots and
assassination attempts on Tito, 70 in total. There are
descriptions of about 18 main plots, although their number
is higher. On an occasion, Tito himself referred to 23
attempts; yet that was the number he was led to believe for
security's reasons. Following the military secret service
methodology, I analyze 52 assassination attempts and group
them into (thwarted or aborted) assassination plans (25),
failed (or misfired) attempts (24) and fully implemented
Political plots and assassination attempts on Tito (70) may
be divided into three periods:
1928-1941: Tito's illegal
operation as a member of the Communist Party of
1941-1945: Tito as leader
of the National Liberation War (15),
1945-1980: Tito as Head of
the SFRY and the Yugoslav People's Army (YPA) (52).
In addition, I describe two
counter-intelligence operations in foreign countries, in
which I personally took part. In conclusion, it is pointed
out that the final truth about plots and attempts on Tito's
life remains locked away in the archives of secret services
– in Belgrade and in other foreign countries. As Tito's
mother was Slovene, I regard him as a Slovene political
leader. Last but not least, he ranked fourth in 2005 on
Slovenia's list of the most popular Slovene historic
TITO PLOTS AND ATTEMPTS author's ideas about the
relation between Jovanka Broz and Josip Broz Tito may be
found in Brainy Encyclopedia.
the article in Brainy Encyclopedia (Posted:
22.09.2009 - temporary not reacheable)
THE BLUE GUARD: A CONFIDENTIAL REPORT
BY THE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF
PLAVA GARDA: POVELJNIKOVO ZAUPNO POROČILO, PRO-ANDY, s.p.,: Maribor
SLOVENAČKI ČETNICI. Filip Višnjić: Beograd top of
Many people in Slovenia are not aware that
during the Italian and German occupation between 1941 and 1945 there
were not only Partisans and the domobranci (Slovene Home Guard) but also
Chetniks, in Slovenia known as the Blue Guard. Their Commander-in-Chief
was Major of the General Staff (later on: Colonel) Karl Novak, a Chetnik
duke, and as of September 1943 Colonel (later on: Brigadier General)
Ivan Prezelj – Andrej (nom de guerre). There were about 300 to 600
Chetniks in central Slovenia, and after 1944 about 250 Chetniks in
Štajersko in north-eastern Slovenia. They were all Italian and German
In Slovenia the Chetnik issue was brought up again later on. In 1998,
Dr. Aleksander Bajt, a well-known Slovene academic, wrote the book
entitled Dosje Bergman ("Bergman File"), in which he uncovered that he
had been a Chetnik lieutenant on Novak's Chetnik staff in Italy. New
surprising details followed in 2003, when it was disclosed that Leon
Štukelj, the internationally well-known Slovene Olympic gold medalist,
was a Chetnik and British agent, and in 2006, when it became known that
Hrvoj Maister, a son of General Rudolf Maister, was a Chetnik colonel!
In April 2006 Slobodan Kljakić, a Serbian reporter from Belgrade,
offered to me a confidential report written by Colonel Karl Novak, the
Chetnik Commander-in-Chief in Slovenia, which was sent to Colonel Živan
Knežević in 1946, Adjutant to Yugoslavia's King Peter II. The document
travelled from the US to Chetnik Major Kosić in Serbia, who passed it on
to his friend, Mr. Bosnić, giving it finally to the reporter Kljakić.
Slobodan Klajkić and I decided to have the book first published in
Slovenia and afterwards in Serbia. The Slovene book entitled "The Blue
Guard: a Confidential Report by the Commander-in-Chief" was published by
Pro-Andy in May 2006, while the Serbian edition entitled 's lovene
Chetniks" was brought out in Belgrade in December 2006.
SLOVENE CHETNIKS OF ŠTAJERSKA: GERMAN COLLABORATORS?
"ŠTAJERSKI ČETNIKI: NEMŠKI KOLABORANTI?."
Nedeljski dnevnik. Ljubljana
(13/02/2007.) top of
Since Novak's confidential report
contained no information on Chetniks of Štajersko, I delved into the
Archives of Slovenia after publishing the book "The Blue Guard".
As a 9-year-old boy living in the hilly region of Slovenske gorice in
north-eastern Slovenia I encountered in October 1944 a group of Chetniks
who by mistake killed the cook of our priest Alojz Klobasa – Püčko, with
whom I served as an altar boy.
Colonel Karl Novak left the Slovene Chetniks in September 1943, which
suggests that the Štajersko Chetniks had not been organized by that
time. Historical sources and memoirs mention that Lieutenant Jože
Melaher - Zmagoslav after a few months after the German occupation
started to collect Slovene boys, becoming the Commander of the Štajersko
Chetnik Unit. His memoirs published in the US, contain a number of
inaccurate facts, while some relevant data are simply ignored.
Naturally, he does not mention that he was an agent working for the
Abwehr and later for the Gestapo. The first to mention this was Melaher's
courier and curate Henrik Goričan, who was arrested by the Gestapo and
sent to Dachau. I learnt about the Štajersko Chetniks from the history
degree thesis by Katja Zupanič, which she defended at Maribor University
in 2000. I obtained the most relevant data from a Chetnik called "Rado", who was involved in the Chetnik attack on our village in October 1944.
"Rado" was my guest at the promotion of my book "The Blue Guard" in
"Rado"'s saddest moment happened in January 1945, when he was present at
Melaher's signing the collaboration agreement with the Germans against
the Slovene Partisans. In May 1945 there were about 250 Štajersko
Chetniks, 500 men and women, including their families and friends. 125
men managed to flee to Austrian Carinthia, while only 75 Chetniks made
it to the British refugee camp in Italy, "Rado" being one of them. He,
however, returned to his homeland in 1947.
"ATTACK" on the German Gendarme Station
in Sv. Jurij ob Ščavnici
"Četniški napad na nemško
orožniško postajo pri Sv. Juriju ob Ščavnici."
In: Glasilo. No. 1-2/XII, 2006. Gornja Radgona: Zgodovinsko
društvo Gornja radgona. top of
In his memoirs, Lieutenant
Jože Melaher - Zmagoslav, Commander of Štajersko Chetnik
Unit, mention three attacks on the German forces in
Štajersko. As a 9-year boy I witnessed such an "attack" on
October 21 1944.
In May 2006 "Rado", a Chetnik involved in the "attack", and
I made a reconstruction of the event, which, properly
speaking, was more of a foray than an attack. "Rado" told me
that three groups of the first Chetnik Company had been
given a mission to disarm all the gendarmes at the station.
They did so, finding about 70 rifles in the weapons dump.
Yet Sergeant Franz Ogrizek, Company Commander, wanting to
frighten our parish priest Alojz Klobasa – Püčko, shot
accidentally his cook. The final result of the Chetnik "attack"
was a shot cook and 70 confiscated rifles.
MYSTERIOUS DEATH OF CHETNIK GENERAL DRAŽA MIHAILOVIĆ
in four instalments)
Slobodan Kljakić. "Skrivnost smrti četniškega generala
into Slovene and adapted by Marijan F. Kranjc.) Nedeljski dnevnik.
Ljubljana. (July 2007.) top of
Miodrag - Mija Nikolić, an
officer of the Yugoslav OZNA security agency, in his
autobiographic book Odraščanje in ideali ("Growing up and
Ideals"), published in Niš, Serbia, 2006, writes that after
his death sentence in 1946 General Mihailović was not
executed, but died in Moscow in 1960.
This sensational news shocked the Serbian people, especially
the old Chetniks. The historians and the old members of the
Communist Party of Yugoslavia knew that in 1972 Vladimir
Dedijer, Tito's biographer, said that the data about whether
Dragiša Vasić and Draža Mihailović had been Soviet agents in
political or in military intelligence services (GRU) should
be looked for in the Moscow archives. In 1935, a Yugoslav
military attache to Sofia, Bolgaria, Colonel Mihailović, was
recruited as a secret agent by the Soviet military attache
General Wassily Timofeyevich Suhorukov. Dragiša Vasić,
however, had been an old secret agent for the Comintern.
The first news about this matter was announced by the
Russian historian Dr. Boris Starkov at St. Petersburg
University at an international symposium on history in Spain,
1993. The author of this article, Slobodan Kljakić, met Dr.
Starkov in Belgrade in 1995, where the former confirmed his
discovery about General Mihailović and Vasić.
Another Russian historian, Artyom Ulunjan, told the Croatian
weekly Globus in 1998 that Mustafa Golubić, the oldest
Soviet secret agent, organized in 1936 in Istanbul a meeting
between colonel Mihailović and Josip Broz Tito, who was just
returning from the Soviet Union to Yugoslavia.
In 1940 Mustafa Golubić became the head of the Soviet Union
spy network in Yugoslavia (and Balkan) and sent Dragiša
Vasić to the Chetnik staff in Ravna Gora, organizing two
meetings between Tito and Mihailović in June 1941. After
that time Mustafa Golubić was arrested by the Gestapo and
At the end of WW2, in November
1945, the OZNA captured Colonel Nikola Kalabić, former
Commander of the Royal Mountain Guard, who agreed for the
price of his own life to play Ozna's "big game:" in March
1946 a group of masked OZNA men lead by Kalabić tracked down
General Mihailović in a small village of Dobruna. A
stupefied General Mihailović was brought to the OZNA prison
in Belgrade on 13th May 1946. Before that Marshal Josip Broz
Tito and his closest co-worker Edvard Kardelj, both former
Comintern agents, had agreed that General Mihailović would
be free to go to the West, while all other Yugoslav
politicians insisted that he be tried at a major trial
together with German collaborators. Later on, Stalin, the
great leader of the Soviet Union, demanded that General
Mihailović, a former agent of the Soviet military
intelligence service, be granted a passage to the Soviet
Some of the Chetnik prisoners were not executed. Dragi
Jovanović, Chief of the Special Police in Belgrade, lived
for another three years and helped the UDBA, i.e. the SFRY
secret police organization. Stalin may indeed have
remembered his man, i.e. General Mihailović. As Tito and
Kardelj claimed: "General Mihailović was not sent to the
West, but to the East!"
The OZNA informed Branko, General Mihailović's oldest son
and a Partisan, that his father lived until 1953 in Barajevo
The old Chetniks' great wish is to see Mihailović's grave at
the "House of Flowers," the mausoleum in Belgrade - by the
side of Tito?
LIFE WITH LEKA - THE TRUTH ABOUT THE BRION PLENUM
Življenje z Leko: spomini slovenske
partizanke - prof. dr. Ladislave Becele Ranković. by Prof. Ladislava Becela
Ranković. Tr. from Serbian by Liljana Kranjc Tekavec and edited by Marijan F. Kranjc
Huddled in a shelter during the NATO raid in
Belgrade, a group of my former colleagues commented my book The Balkan
Military Range (1998), in which I maintain that the actual
destabilization process of Yugoslavia began in mid-1966 at the Brioni
Plenum meeting of the Central Committee of the League of Communists of
Yugoslavia, when Aleksandar Ranković nicknamed Leka, Tito's Deputy, was
suspended, and the national security system of the Socialist Federative
Republic of Yugoslavia was destroyed, followed later by Slobodan
Milošević destabilizing the Communist Party, the Yugoslav People's Army
and the state.
Discussing my book at the shelter, Admiral Stanislav Brovet pointed out
to his friends and Prof. Ladislava Becele Ranković, Aleksandar's wife
and a WW2 Slovene Partisan, that the 's lovene general wrote the plain
truth about the Brioni Plenum." Hearing this, Mrs Becele Ranković, the
former second Lady of Yugoslavia, decided to send me her book "My Life
with Leka", written in Cyrillic Serbian, furnished with a dedication and
a thank-you note. I determined to have the book translated into Slovene.
I wrote the Foreword and added some new documents, the primary source
being the story by a witness, Colonel Dušan Rusić, my former boss, who
revealed the truth about the Brioni Plenum. In my opinion, the meeting
was the Soviet Union's strategic intelligence operation against
Yugoslavia and Tito or, rather, against the UDBA and Ranković.
It was well-known that the Comintern (and its successor) would never
forgive disloyalty of its members and co-operators, so it is very likely
that it was an act of vengeance that the Soviet intelligence services
took on Tito for his departure from the Informbiro (Cominform), taking a
classic and smart action to compromise the UDBA and the integrity of
Alekasnadar Ranković, one of Tito's best and most loyal friends!
There are new issue-related facts and documents which I added to the
Slovene translation. It was Ivan Kreačić – Stevo, the former head of the
Yugoslav NKVD center who was the principle man behind the Brioni Plenum,
receiving, of course, political support from top Communist Party
officials (Kardelj, Bakarić, Stambolić, Crvenkovski), heads of civilian
and military security services (brothers Milan and Gen. Col. Ivan
Mišković) and relying on "evidence" from Croatia, i.e. Jovanka Broz's
bugged telephone and false telephone cables to Ranković's villa mounted
by the Zagreb operations and technology team while the Ranković family
were on holiday in Dubrovnik.
MEMOIRS OF FRANJO MALGAJ
2009. VOJNI SPOMINI 1914-1919,
PRO-ANDY, s.p.,: Maribor top of
Reserve Lieutenant in the
87th Celje Infantry Regiment of the Austro-Hungarian
Carinthian combatant -
First Lieutenant of the Slovene Army and the first
liberator of the Slovene Carinthia (1918-1919)
trainee, comrade-in-arms, and a poet
Slovene legendary hero
Marking the 90th anniversary
of his death, this work is the first complete presentation
of Franjo Malgaj. It is based on official and personal
documents (military orders, notes etc.) and written in
cooperation with Malgaj's relatives, who have saved his
journals, decorations, photographs and other personal
He was born in Hruševec near
Celje in 1894. He finished the lower secondary general
school in Celje and attended the upper secondary general
schools in Kranj and Pazin, Istria.
He finished the Infantry
Reserve Officers School in Gorizia. As an officer candidate
he participated in the First and Second Battles of the
Isonzo front, where he was stricken with typhus. His daring
attack on an Italian fort on Monte Zebio during the Tirol
front in 1916 earned him the Gold Medal for Bravery,
whereupon he was sent to the rear area.
He liberated part of Southern
Carinthia with the Celje volunteer detachment in 1918 and
seized the Carinthian town of Velikovec (Völkermarkt) with
his unit and a company of Serbian volunteers.
On 6 May 1919 he was
surrounded and wounded at Tolsti Vrh in Slovene Carinthia.
He chose an honour suicide, lest the enemy should get him
alive. In 1920 he was posthumously awarded the Karađorđe
fourth-degree Star with Swords.
Gold Medal for Bravery
Karl Troop Cross
KarađorđeStar with Swords
VIKTOR J. ANDREJKA, noble of
LIVNOGRAD, General Staff Colonel of Royal Yugoslav Army and first
Slovene military intelligence officer
(first excerpt from new
book FAMOUS SLOVENE INFORMERS - plan date of edition last
quarter 2010) top of
from a renowned military family, General Staff Colonel
Viktor J. Andrejka Noble, of Livnograd, (1881–1947), is both
the last top military intelligence Slovene officer in the
Austro-Hungarian Army (AHA) and the first Royal Yugoslav
Army (RYA) military intelligence Slovene officer as well as
Head of the most distinguished RYA military intelligence
centre, based in Ljubljana. Col. Andrejka directed members
of the TIGR antifascist resistance movement in their
organized actions aimed at a Slovene Primorska. He was Gen.
Maister's fighter, the first author of a history of the
Slovene army and Head of the Legion of Pro-Carinthia
Fighters. As the last RYA officer to leave Ljubljana he
prevented the destruction of the food storehouses in April
1941, which earned him the appointment of the Chief of the
Ljubljana Municipality Procurement Office during the Italian
occupation. Remaining non-aligned, he only shouldered the
responsibility of being one of the four General Staff
officers in the Slovene Covenant, namely Maj. Novak, Lt.
Col. Peterlin, Col. Vauhnik and Col. Andrejka. In late 1944
he was considered as the successor to Gen. Leon Rupnik,
President of the administration of the Ljubljana Province.
The author of the article believes that as an experienced
military intelligence officer Col. Andrejka must have
secretly worked for the Slovene Liberation Front, as was the
case with Col. Vauhnik working with the Slovene author and
Comintern agent Lovro Kuhar (Prežihov Voranc). Col. Andrejka
certainly belonged to the group of neutral or “fair officers”
in the RYA, lead by Brig. Gen. Ferdinand Janež, Gendarmerie
Col. Alojzij Barle and General Staff Col. Viktor Andrejka.
Due to the Communist Party’s sectarianism, the work of this
fairly large group of Slovene officers and NCOs in the RYA
has not been given the adequate attention, yet documents in
the Archives of the Republic of Slovenia bear witness to
their bona fides and patriotic conduct.
Military Intelligence Legends Summary of the book LEGENDARNI SLOVENSKI OBVEŠČEVALCI,
PRO-ANDY, Maribor 2011 (Translated by
prof. dr. Silvana Kos Orel) top of
Slovene Military Intelligence Legends: Military Intelligence
and Counter-Intelligence Officers 1919—1991 is the first
work of the kind in Slovene military history.
Numerous monographs worldwide present the world history of
espionage, military intelligence and counter-intelligence
activities, competent intelligence officers, intelligence
centre heads, their secret field workers and co-workers, yet,
to my knowledge, none contains any information on Slovenes.
This is rather unfair, as in the recent decades I myself
have known some top military intelligence officers and
counter-intelligence officers and their secret field co-workers.
This is the reason why I decided to write a national review
of military intelligence legends enabling the presented
Slovenes to find their way into world reference books,
specialist journals and historical monographs.
There have been several top intelligence officers in Slovene
history: Josip Kopinič, a colonel of the Yugoslav National
Army, who was the head of the Comintern intelligence centre
and the Soviet Army intelligence centre, both Zagreb-based,
and Vladimir Vauhnik, a colonel of the Royal Yugoslav Army,
who was renowned as a military attaché to Berlin and an
analyst at the British military intelligence centre in
Ljubljana. Another operative ranking among the best is
Andrej Kobal, a reserve colonel in the US Air Force, who
worked as an intelligence officer in the Oss operations in
the Near East and Bulgaria and participated in the formation
of Cia. These are three undisputable greats, three Slovene
military intelligence legends.
A fourth legend is Carinthian Slovene Emil Wedam, an Abwehr
Lieutenant, who was undoubtedly the best secret co-worker of
the Ljubljana military intelligence centre, a veritable
super spy of Slovene origin.
Many Slovenes may not be aware that Lt.Colonel Rudolf
Vaupotič was General Maister's first security officer and
that Colonel of the General Staff Viktor Andrejka -
Livnograd established the efficient Ljubljana-based military
intelligence centre as early as 1922. Furthermore, too
little is known about the partisan intelligence officers
Lieutenant Miro Kranjec, Major Andreana Družina, Colonels
Franc Pirc and Vito Kraigher, as well as about three Allied
intelligence officers Colonels Andrej Glušič, Hrvoj Maister
and Lieutenant Ivan Rudolf.
Moreover, much data pertaining to the history of the
Yugoslav People's Army (YPA) is hidden beneath the shroud of
secrecy, e.g. the fact that the Yugoslav Military
Intelligence Service was also headed by Slovene Colonel
General Rado Pehaček and Admiral Stanislav Brovet. Even
fewer know that Major-General Alojz Ahlin was deputy head of
the YPA Military Security Service, and that its Slovenia-based
detachment within the 9th Army Corps in Ljubljana was headed
by four Slovenes: three partisans, ie. Colonels Zvone Rak,
Alojz Škufca and Albin Barle, and, between 1984 and 1987, by
myself as the first post-war officer and the last Slovene.
The present monograph is based on memoirs and a series of
records, as the archives have been destroyed, eg. the
Yugoslav and German archives on Vauhnik, or are still closed,
eg. the Comintern archives on Kopinič.
The 1941—1985 period is described on the basis of two
monographs on the intelligence and security (counter-intelligence)
service of the YPA. Slovenia’s Security and Intelligence
Service (Vos) is mentioned only in passing, as it was more
of a political body maintaining a tough Party line rather
than a military security organisation. My book neither
tackles the security service nor the civil sector of the
SFRY, with Ozna (the Department of National Protection) as
Yugoslavia’s first security service, followed by Udba and
Sdv (the State Security Service), the latter one
restructured in 1991 as Slovenia’s Sova, ie. the Slovene
Intelligence and Security Agency.
The 1985—1991 period is covered by my memoirs and
observations. The book ends with a reprint of my article
from 2002 entitled The prime objections to the suppressed
issues of Slovenia's 1991 independence war. It also
addresses objections to untruths and unfounded criticisms
levelled at the so-called “Serbian” Kos (the SFRY Counter-Intelligence
In the first place, I wanted to present Slovene generals or
admirals, officers and NCOs who, having distinguished
themselves as intelligence and security officers and scouts,
were appointed to senior positions, such as intelligence
service chiefs of general staff: Field-Marshal-Lieutenant
Karl von Tegetthoff in the Austro-Hungarian Army and Colonel
General Rado Pehaček and Admiral Stanislav Brovet in the YPA.
There were several efficient heads of military intelligence
centres, ie. Colonels Andrejka, Kopinič, Pirc and Kobal,
Lt.Colonel Slekovec, Major Družinič, Lieutenant Kranjec, and
military attachés, ie. Colonels Vauhnik and Stropnik.
While there have been many secret field workers and co-workers,
it is necessary to know that much data and numerous persons
will never be officially known, as the working principle of
true-blue intelligence and counter-intelligence officers
still holds true, namely that all secrets concerning their
work should be taken into their grave. As a rule, military
intelligence and counter-intelligence services prefer not to
disclose their secrets and sources.
Naturally, this book on military intelligence and counter-intelligence
manages to only partly fill the void within Slovene military
history, providing an incentive for future researchers to
study yet unexplored areas, as the secret archives of
national and foreign intelligence and counter-intelligence
66 years later: Father's grave
found in Australia
The truth finally revealed - Jernej Poštrak never let on the
Chetniks' hideout top of
I mention in my article on Štajersko (Slovene Styrian)
Chetniks that it was the »pro-German« Jernej Poštrak that
told to the Germans on the Chetnik commander Jože Melaher's
hideout at Zgornji Duplek some time in 1943. A few days
later Poštrak was brutally beaten by two Chetniks, Melaher
and Golob, who had managed to escape from the stormed
I have been recently told by Poštrak's daughter Ljudmila
Vodušek, living in Sweden, that the hideout had not been
divulged by her father, but a relative of theirs. The father
never returned to his wife and ten children in the aftermath
of WW II, fearing, as a former member of the German army,
the threat of being liquidated. After 66 years of persistent
search, Mrs Vodušek finally discovered that her father had
emigrated to Australia, where he started a new family and
died in 1979.
In late April 2010 I received
a letter from the still living Chetnik sergeant “Rado”, who
has been working on his war memoirs, clarifying the
Naturally, “Rado” could
not have been familiar with the actual traitor of the
three draft dodgers or deserters from the German army,
hiding in the Zgornji Duplek caves, since “Rado” joined
the Chetniks only a year later, in March of 1944.
Chetnik commander Melaher
later told “Rado” that the Chetnik's hideout had been
presumably betrayed by Terezija Poštrak, who directed
her son Jernej to the Zgornji Duplek Mayor Rudolf
Partljič. Afterwards, on 6 February 1943, the Gestapo
was informed by the mayor's secretary Rues.
In 1944 “Rado” witnessed
the punishment, i.e. beating, of the gendarme Jože
Glonar, who used the rifle butt to smash the dead dodger
Mirko Knuplež's head.
After the liberation the
escaped draft dodger Milko Golob, later a partisan and
OZNA security agency officer in the Slovene towns of
Ptuj in Lendava, was said to have sought revenge on the
secretary Rues, the gendarme Glonar as well as Jernej
Poštrak, who would not dare return home but rather
emigrated to Australia.
Who is going to protect
and defend Slovenia? Towards a new security and
defence system of the Republic of Slovenia top of
Marijan F. Kranjc,
The Contemporary Military
Challenges journal presents academic papers on a future
transformation of the Slovenian Armed Forces and the
security and defence system of the Republic of Slovenia
written by LTC General Iztok Podbregar, PhD, and Major
General Alojz Šteiner, MSc, the former and present Chiefs of
General Staff of the Slovenian Armed Forces. In a long and
lively debate I seconded almost all their ideas and
proposals. The following is a list of my final proposals
that the visitors to my “MILITARY” website may be interested
It is necessary to
implement the fundamental intention of NATO’s new
Strategic Concept, which endorses national solutions,
meaning that there is a need for a small-scale and
efficient army, capable, independently or within an
alliance, of cybernetic and nuclear-missile warfare.
The new government of the
Republic of Slovenia should not have more than seven
departments, ie. Ministries of Foreign Affairs; Economy
and Finance; Health and Social Affairs, Culture, Science,
Education and Sport; Justice and Public Administration;
Transport and Environment; and a united Ministry of
Armed and Police Forces.
The present organization
of the Slovenian Armed Forces, ie. professional service
members and contracted reserve, has to be abandoned, as
it lacks functionality and is not conducive to the self-sufficient
defence of the Republic of Slovenia. The country has to
be defended by its own (professionally qualified)
citizens, not by foreigners and mercenaries. Basically,
the existing set-up is aimed at international
It is necessary to
reconsider our historical and traditional experience
that enabled the persistence and defence of Slovenian
territory (the Republic of Slovenia), and to abandon
foreign impractical experience and models, such as
reserve police officers and gendarmes. What I have in
mind is the successful partisan resistance movement
between 1941 and 1945, and the efficient operation of
the Territorial Defence in 1991. Therefore I propose a
combined system of territorial operations, which should
require the re-introduction of a 6-month national
service and a conscript system (3-month military drill).
The Armed Forces should consist of the active component
(full-time senior members and professional soldiers –
specialists) and the reserve component. All other non-warfare
systems, including the special department for an
alternative civilian service, should be extracted from
the Slovenian Armed Forces and attached to the Police
Forces or the sector of security and defence.
The mobilization system
should reintroduce conscription (for combat units and
alternative civilian service in aid and rescue units). A
minimum (3-month) Basic Training would be held at
territorial (regional) training centres. To do their 3-month
national service, the soldiers should be sent into the
nearest operational-territorial unit, to which they
would remain assigned. Also, reserve soldiers may be
treated as a source of professional soldiers –
The brigade system should
be reorganized into the corps system, with the Force
Command of the Slovenian Armed Forces and the fourth-level
leadership and command being closed.
The size of the Slovenian
Armed Forces should be subject to professional analyses
and studies. The military defence of the Republic of
Slovenia seems not to require more than: two motorized
corps (corresponding to the size of three brigades, each
of these having a mechanized battalion), mountain
brigade, missile anti-armour battalion, anti-aircraft
missile defence battalion, helicopter battalion and
marine defence battalion.
The general staff should
establish an anti-cybernetic centre with an anti-electronic
warfare unit, whereas the corps and the brigades should
have their subsidiary centres with the same standards as
the allied forces. The traditional units should be
developed by a new, ie. “Electronic-Cybernetic Unit”.
The following structures
should be terminated: the Force Command, the naval
battalion (the sale of the Triglav-11 ship required),
the air forces (the sale of Pilatus aircraft required),
and the Support Command (the logistics battalion and
health unit should be taken over by the Chief of General
Staff), whereas the corps should have their territorial
logistics bases and the brigade its mobile logistics
The Command Support units
should close the military vicariate (if a member of the
Slovenian Armed Forces has to seek medical help in
civilian health care facilities, then a worshipper may
seek spiritual help in a local church) and the division
of protocol - the Office of the President of the
Republic of Slovenia and Supreme Commander-in-Chief of
the Slovenian Armed Forces, has its own state protocol
staff, who could also cover military ceremonies. The
guard unit should be reorganized as elite combat unit,
also taking care of the security of the Supreme
Commander-in-Chief, the minister of the armed and police
forces and the Chief of General Staff of the Slovenian
The Doctrine, Development,
Educational and Training Command should be closed,
including all schools, sports and other units, as well
as the centres, except for the Library and Information
Centre and the Military Museum.
Instead of the said
Command, the General Staff of the Slovenian Armed Forces
should organize a Division of Education, which would
include a new-formed Faculty of Military Science with
the departments of Command and Staff, Officers, Non-Commissioned
Officers, Specialists and Foreign Languages. The
existing four centres should re-establish the Centre for
Strategic and Development Studies.
As the future Slovenian
Armed Forces should be exclusively aimed at combat
activities, it makes sense that we do not have an “army
of old men”, aid and rescue staff, inspector offices and
the like. What should be retained is contracted soldiers
– professionals (for a period of 10 years) as well as
contracted officers and non-commissioned officers (for a
period of 30 years). This special status should exempt
them from the category of public service employees.
Having their responsibilities increased, they should be
paid substantially higher salaries, comparable to the
same categories in the allied forces (now partly in the
peacekeeping missions). The Aid and Rescues Staff should
be attached to the Police Forces, which should also take
over voluntary and private structures.
The presented and other
proposals call for a number of detailed studies. The readers
shall understand that my ideas have not been supported by
professional studies of experts working in different fields.
Sometimes it is the very ideas that count. So much more when
they result from extensive professional knowledge and
practical working experience.
Stanislav Rapotec, aka Stanislaus (Ivan) Rapotec
Frank van Krevel top of
Ivan Božič was born on 9th January 1894 in Jurovo,
Croatia. He came from a progressive family of farmers in the
vicinity of the Slovenian town of Vipava, who eventually
settled in the vicinity of the Slovenian town of Metlika.
Božič was an officer serving in four armies: he was Second
Lieutenant in the Austro-Hungarian army, Captain of the
Serbian volunteer army or the army of the State of Slovenes,
Croats and Serbs in Russia, Colonel in the Army of the
Kingdom of Yugoslavia, as well as Colonel and Major-General
in the Yugoslav People’s Army. He was an excellent commander
of the Matija Blagodić regiment and the Vladivostok
Evacuation Detachment of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes. Later
on, he was the King's adjutant and a detachment commander.
After the April war in 1941 he ended up in a German prisoner's
camp. He was a supporter of the National Liberation movement.
In 1947 he was promoted to the rank of Major-General. He was
a lecturer and a founder of military geography and as such
the first Slovene military geographer. He received a number
of decorations in his native country and abroad. He was
married to Russian Irina Baranov, they had, however, no
children. Ivan Božič died in 1962 in Belgrade, Serbia, where
he is buried. His relatives live in the southern part of
Stanislav Rapotec, AKA Stanislaus (Ivan) Rapotec, was
born on 22nd October 1911 in Kozina, Slovenia. He came from
a family of railway workers and antifascists, who settled in
the town of Škofja Loka, Slovenia, after 1918. During the
time of his secondary school and university education in
Ljubljana and Zagreb respectively, he was an active member
of “revolutionary” student organisations. He studied
economics. He was connected with persons of interest to the
intelligence service. As a reserve officer of the Army of
the Kingdom of Yugoslavia, he was a member of the military
intelligence service. From 1941 onwards he was a foreign
intelligence officer of the Yugoslav army and a secret agent
of the British Special Operations Executive (SOE), code
number A/H69. In the “HENNA” mission launched by the SOE in
January 1942, Rapotec was landed by submarine on the
Adriatic coast, where he gathered intelligence reports. He
established contacts with Dr. Aloysius Stepinac, Archbishop
of Zagreb, and Major Karl Novak, Commander of Slovene
Chetniks. Rapotec was demobilised as Captain of the British
Army in 1948 and settled in Australia. He finished his study
of economics there. He was involved in abstract painting and
attained worldwide success. Rapotec was made a member of the
Order of Australia for service to the arts. He would come to
Slovenia and exhibit his works of art there after 1991. He
was married with no children. Stanislaus Rapotec died in
1997 in Sydney, where he is buried. His relatives live in
the western parts of Slovenia.
Frank van Krevel was born in Heerlen, the Netherlands,
in 1968. His mother, née Kenda, came from a family of miners
living in the vicinity of Bovec, Slovenia. Her parents
joined the Slovene mining community in Limburg in 1930. Van
Krevel became a bank clerk and was a young member of
democratic movements in Europe. He was taught Slovene by his
grandmother, soon to become interested in research of
Slovene immigration to the Netherlands. Following the events
in Slovenia in late June 1991, van Krevel and a group of
Dutch people of Slovene descent made special efforts towards
the recognition of the young independent country of Slovenia.
He was the Chairman of the Committee for the recognition of
the Republic of Slovenia, which won him The Order of
Services, presented to him by Dr. Danilo Türk, President of
the Republic of Slovenia, in Den Haag in December 2011. He
has launched a number of projects for the association of the
Friends of Slovenia in the Netherlands. He was the first
foreign promoter of the Slovene Armed Forces in August 1991.
Father Bruno is my maternal relative of the Korošak family.
I refer to him as a »God's Warrior« since he has fought for
the truth in religion and theology.
Father Bruno was born in Maribor, Slovenia, in 1920. His
family derives from places of Grlava and Grabonoš, with his
ancestral roots going back as early as 1470. He attended
grammar school in Ljubljana. As a Franciscan he started his
theology study in1941, finishing it in Rome, where he was
consecrated as a priest in 1943.
Father Bruno has devoted his life to the study of religious
truths. He earned his doctoral degree in 1954, soon to
become a university teacher of theology. Proficient in as
many as 14 languages of the world, he can be considered a
true polyglot. In 1978 he became Secretary General of the
renowned Pontifical Urbaniana University in Rome.
Father Bruno has published as many as 26 books and 64
articles. He has contributed to four canonization procedures,
including the Slovenian Bishops Baraga and Slomšek.
Retiring in 1984, he has lived at the Kostanjevica Monastery
at Nova Gorica, Slovenia. He was well-known among the
Slovenians as a priest at the Alpine pilgrimage church at
Svete Višarje/Monte Santo di Lussari for many years. In a
2012 interview for Jana, a Slovenian women's magazine,
Father Bruno let know the women of Slovenia that love and
sex should not be considered as sinful.
In 2003, Father Bruno celebrated his 60th anniversary of
priesthood at the Sveti Duh church, Slovenia, where writer
Vinko Korošak presented his »Peasant Dynasty«, a romanced
novel based on the Korošak family tree that I myself have
Father Bruno celebrated his 92th birthday in 2012. He has
lived a rich life and we wish him still many happy returns
of the day!
Struggle for Carinthia of 1918-1919
Serbian volunteers to the struggle for the Slovene Northern
and Western borders top of
There has been no relevant study by Slovene or Serbian
historians on the contribution of Serbian volunteers to the
struggle for the Slovene Northern and Western borders,
except for a handful of journal articles and nationalist
responses published in newspapers. This has been due to
several reasons, primarily due to the shortage of primary
(archival) sources on the topic, which resulted in some
arguable and biased assessments. The scarcity of published
items does not allow a final assessment on the contribution
of the Serbian volunteers to the struggle. The author
proposes a new survey of the preserved archival materials,
especially those kept at the archives of the Supreme Command
of the Serbian Army and foreign archives, as well as other
sources and publications.
WWI, struggle for Slovene Northern and Western borders,
Serbian POW’s - volunteers, illegal part of (Slovene) Army,
Serbian Army – legal allied army, KIA Serbian volunteers and
Janko Stibiel - Vukasović,
Slovene volunteer and Serbian Army Colonel top of
Colonel Janko Vukasović, 1918
In my book Slovene Military Intelligence (2005), Janko
Stibiel – Vukasović is presented as follows:
Janko VUKASOVIĆ - STIBIEL, Serbian Army Colonel, b.
1851 at Vrtovin near Ajdovščina (present-day Slovenia),
1876: Serbian resistance volunteer soldier in Bosnia,
Serbian Army Sergeant promoted to the rank of Colonel and
receiver of several decorations, Supreme-Commander in Chief
and Serbian Gendarme Commander, Belgrade defender,
participant in the withdrawal across Albania, Salonika Front
soldier, 1919: Royal Yugoslav Army Colonel appointed as
Assist. Commander of the Drava Division in Ljubljana, 1921:
retired, 1923: dies in Ljubljana, buried at his native
I have obtained new data from his relative, poetess Tatjana
Malec, and the military archives in Vienna and Belgrade. As
an Austrian Military Navy Sergeant he deserted into Serbia
in 1875, where he worked as a correspondent. He was married
to Jelena, General Šturm's daughter. They had six children,
among them Academic Pavle Vukasović, PhD.
Royal Yugoslav Army Brigadier General top of
Colonel Otmar Langerholz, 1939
Here is an update of the
data on General Otmar Langerholz, mentioned in my book
Slovene Military Intelligence (2005):
I have been contacted by
several of his relatives from Belgrade, his grandson Radovan
Kovačević, BSc (Eng), his granddaughters Nina Mihajlović,
PhD, Sanja Marinković, BA, and Milena Kovačević.
They have contributed the following data: General Otmar
Langerholz was born in Celje and died in Belgrade in 1970.
He had three daughters, Ivet, Rene and Anriet, who was
married to Lieutenant General Milan Kovačević. He was
General Maister’s soldier, fighting in Carinthia in 1919. He
was in German captivity during WW2, between 1941 and 1945.